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CAUSE TO BELIEVE WHAT? THE IMPORTANCE OF
DEFINING A SEARCH’S OBJECT—OR, HOW THE
ABA WOULD ANALYZE THE NSA METADATA
SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN*
Courts and scholars have devoted considerable attention to the
definition of probable cause and reasonable suspicion. Since the
demise of the “mere evidence rule” in the 1960s, however, they have
rarely examined how these central Fourth Amendment concepts
interact with the “object” of the search. That is unfortunate,
because this interaction can have significant consequences. For
instance, probable cause to believe that a search “might lead to
evidence of wrongdoing” triggers a very different inquiry than
probable cause to believe that a search “will produce evidence of
criminal activity.” The failure to address the constraints that should
be imposed on the object of a search has particularly acute
implications in the context of records searches. This article explores
the ramifications of this gap in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
both generally and in connection with the NSA’s metadata program,
with particular attention to how the American Bar Association’s
Standards on Law Enforcement Access to Third Party Records, the
topic of this symposium, resolve the relevant issues.
Recent disclosures prompted by former National Security Agency
analyst Edward Snowden’s revelations have corroborated earlier allegations
that the NSA has, for at least the past seven years, been collecting and
analyzing vast amounts of domestic as well as foreign communications
information.1 Some allege that the NSA is accessing the content of all
phone and email communications, not just from foreign sources but from
domestic sources as well.2 The NSA has not owned up to that practice, but
* Milton Underwood Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. The
author was on the Task Force that drafted the American Bar Association’s CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STANDARDS ON LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO THIRD PARTY RECORDS. See infra note 5.
1. Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Collects Millions of E-mail Address Books
Globally, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 2013, at A1.
2. Glenn Greenwald, XKeyscore: NSA Tool Collects “Nearly Everything a User Does
on the Internet”, GUARDIAN (July 31, 2013, 8:56 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/
2013/jul/31/nsa-top-secret-program-online-data (“A top secret National Security Agency
program allows analysts to search with no prior authorization through vast databases
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it has admitted to storing telephonic metadata—that is, the anonymous
envelope or transmittal information associated with phone calls—in
connection with virtually every call made in or through the United States.3
Further, it has conceded that it is subjecting this metadata to “queries”
meant to identify those who communicate with “seed identifiers” who are
thought to be connected to terrorist or other clandestine threats to national
security.4
One goal of this essay is to analyze how the American Bar Association’s
Criminal Justice Standards on Law Enforcement Access to Third Party
Records (LEATPR Standards), the provisions that are the subject of this
symposium, would regulate the NSA’s metadata program.5 The LEATPR
Standards make clear in their very first substantive provision that they do
not apply to “access[ing] . . . records for purposes of national security.”6
But the NSA program is representative of a number of other domestic law
enforcement efforts—for instance, the seventy-plus “fusion centers” that
have been set up to collect and fuse together information from public and
private sources—that also involve government accumulation of vast
amounts of data.7 Because, thanks to Snowden, we know as much or more
about the NSA’s program as these other programs, the NSA’s collection of
metadata is a useful springboard for discussing how the Standards would
work in these routine criminal investigation contexts.
The second, and more fundamental, goal of this essay is to elucidate a
much neglected aspect of surveillance law and of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence generally. Under the Fourth Amendment, most searches
require probable cause, but some searches or “search-like” activities require
containing emails, online chats and the browsing histories of millions of individuals,
according to documents provided by whistleblower Edward Snowden.”).
3. See David S. Kris, On the Bulk Collection of Tangible Things, LAWFARE RES. PAPER
SERIES, Sept. 29, 2013, at 6 & n.24, http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/
09/Lawfare-Research-Paper-Series-No.-4-2.pdf (describing government’s declassification of
an order from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court authorizing the metadata
collection and the government’s additional disclosures about the program).
4. See id. at 10 & n.41.
5. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ON LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO THIRD PARTY
RECORDS (2013). Individual standards will be referred to using the format ‘STANDARD x-x.’
6. STANDARD 25-2.1(a).
7. For a description of fusion centers, see THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT,
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUSION CENTERS: PRESERVING PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
WHILE PROTECTING AGAINST CRIME AND TERRORISM 4-7 (2012), available at http://
constitutionproject.org/pdf/fusioncenterreport.pdf.
See also Christopher Slobogin,
Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 317-321
(2008) (describing a number of “large-scale” federal data mining programs).
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a lesser threshold such as reasonable suspicion.8 These justificatory
concepts—what this essay will call “standards of proof”—are ambiguous in
and of themselves, as many have pointed out.9 But a further ambiguity, one
that has received little attention in either case law or scholarship, is how
these concepts relate to what this essay will call “the object” of the search.
For instance, probable cause to believe that a search might lead to evidence
of wrongdoing triggers a very different inquiry than probable cause to
believe that a search will produce evidence of criminal activity.10 While the
latter language requires a fair degree of certainty that solid evidence of
crime will result from the search, the former standard might permit a much
wider ranging exploration, which could be aimed at finding even the most
circumstantial proof of minimally harmful conduct. Yet in recent times
very few courts or scholars have recognized this distinction, much less
explored its implications for Fourth Amendment or statutory law.11
This failure to address the constraints that should be imposed on the
object of a search or seizure has particularly acute repercussions in the
context of records searches. Records sought by the government often
contain no evidence of wrongdoing or only very tangential evidence of it, a
fact known by the government at the time it seeks the records. For instance,
the NSA staff that runs the metadata program knows that only a very small
percentage of the records subjected to its bulk collection procedure—which
accesses the communication logs of virtually everyone in the country—will
produce evidence of even mundane criminal activity, much less terrorism.12
The staff also knows that even those records that are linked to a terrorist
8. See Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 370 (2009) (“The
Fourth Amendment ‘right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against
unreasonable searches and seizures’ generally requires a law enforcement officer to have
probable cause for conducting a search” (citation omitted)); United States v. Sokolow, 490
U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (noting that “reasonable suspicion” is required for a stop and stating that
“the level of suspicion required for a Terry stop is obviously less demanding than that for
probable cause”); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012) (requiring “specific and articulable
facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that . . . the records or other
information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation”).
9. E.g., Bruce A. Antkowiak, Saving Probable Cause, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 569, 588
(2007) (noting several authors and justices who have concluded that “because attempts to
define or describe probable cause produce variable, ambiguous, and shifting meanings over
time, the term evades definition”).
10. See infra Part I.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 40-49.
12. See Spencer Ackerman, NSA Review Panel Casts Doubt on Bulk Data Collection
Claims, GUARDIAN (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/14/nsareview-panel-senate-phone-data-terrorism.
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will usually end up being useless in the quest to protect national security.13
At most, the NSA’s queries will uncover the identity of someone who has
communicated with a known terrorist; much more investigation, either of
the content of the communication or of other social network information,
must be conducted before anything evidential will be discovered.
The same scenario can arise in routine criminal investigations. Assume
police suspect Mr. X of committing an armed robbery. Phone records, bank
records, travel records, and a host of other documentary sources might be
relevant to their investigation if, for instance, police want to establish Mr.
X’s location at a particular time, discover the items he bought before the
robbery, or identify the people he may have contacted around the time it
occurred. Arguably, it is not only important to figure out the likelihood that
these types of records will be discovered (the standard of proof issue) but
also the likelihood that the information in those records will be useful to the
government’s case (the search object issue). Even if, as the Supreme Court
seems to think, the Fourth Amendment does not protect most records
containing personal information when they are in the possession of third
parties,14 these types of issues need to be resolved in connection with
statutory enactments and administrative practice.15
This essay first explicates, in Part I, the nuanced ways in which the
object of a search can be conceived and how the object of a search interacts
with the justification for it. Part II then addresses how the LEATPR
Standards deal with this issue, particularly in the context of the NSA
metadata program. Finally, Part III makes some suggestions for improving
the analysis, based on other work I have done.
13. The NSA claims that it has foiled over fifty terrorist attacks worldwide. Kimberly
Dozier, NSA: Surveillance Programs Foiled Some 50 Terrorist Plots Worldwide,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 18, 2013), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com /2013/06/
18/nsa-surveillance_n_3460106.html. That figure is probably a gross exaggeration. See
Klayman v. Obama, No. 13-0851, 2013 WL 6571596, at *26 n.65 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2013)
(citing sources disputing this claim and noting that the government had failed to provide
evidence supporting it despite an in camera opportunity to do so). Whatever number is
correct, it is dwarfed by the thousands of queries the government conducts.
14. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979) (“When he used his phone,
petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical information . . . [and] assumed the risk that the
company would reveal to police the numbers he dialed.”); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S.
435, 443 (1976) (holding that a bank depositor “takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to
another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to the Government . . . even if
the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose
and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed”).
15. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012); see also infra text accompanying notes 51-54
(detailing subpoena law).
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I. The Interaction of Cause and Object Justifications

Probable cause is the central justificatory concept in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. As defined by the Supreme Court in the recent decision of
Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding,16 probable cause to search
exists when the known facts “raise a ‘fair probability,’ or a ‘substantial
chance,’ of discovering evidence of criminal activity.”17 Probable cause is
not “hypertechnical”18 but rather consists of a “flexible, common sense
standard.”19 As this language suggests, and as many admit, probable cause
is a slippery concept.20 But there is at least general agreement that,
conceived of as a standard of proof, it falls somewhere below both the noreasonable-doubt standard and the clear and convincing evidence standard,
somewhat above reasonable suspicion, and in the general vicinity of, albeit
somewhat below, the preponderance of the evidence standard used in civil
courts.21 The Court has resisted quantification of these standards but, as a
useful heuristic, reasonable doubt might be equated with a 90% to 95%
probability,22 clear and convincing evidence with a 75% probability,23
preponderance with a 51% probability,24 probable cause between a 40% to
50% chance that the search will be successful,25 and reasonable suspicion
somewhere below that.26 In fact, one survey asking over 160 federal judges
to assign percentages to the latter two concepts found that their answers
averaged out to 48% for probable cause27 and 31% for reasonable

16. 557 U.S. 364 (2009).
17. Id. at 371.
18. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983) (citing United States v. Ventrusca, 380
U.S. 102, 109 (1965)).
19. Id. at 239.
20. See, e.g., Erica Goldberg, Getting Beyond Intuition in the Probable Cause Inquiry,
17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 789, 801 (2013) (“Judges, scholars, and practitioners hold
varying views as to the burden imposed by probable cause, with the largest number of judges
clustering in the range between 30% and 60%.”).
21. See supra note 8 and accompanying text; cf. Gates, 462 U.S. at 235 (“Finely tuned
standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence,
useful in formal trials, have no place in the magistrate’s decision.”).
22. See C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof: Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or
Constitutional Guarantees?, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1293, 1325 tbl.2 (1982).
23. Id. at 1328 tbl.5.
24. Id. at 1331 tbl.7.
25. Id. at 1327 tbl.3.
26. Id. at 1328 tbl.4.
27. Id. at 1327 tbl.3.
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suspicion.28 Probable cause and reasonable suspicion will never be defined
precisely, but courts have become used to the concepts.
Modern courts pay much less attention, however, to what this essay is
calling the “object” of the probable cause and reasonable suspicion
requirements. Note, for instance, that Redding’s definition of probable
cause speaks of a fair probability of “discovering evidence of criminal
activity,”29 without further elaboration or caveat. Yet many of the Supreme
Court’s Fourth Amendment cases have both analyzed and approved
searches for evidence of noncriminal wrongdoing.30 Thus Redding’s use of
the word “criminal” must be taken with a grain of salt, a fact that is worth
emphasizing. That government officials can invade our “houses, persons,
papers and effects”31 looking for proof of mere regulatory infractions raises
large and difficult issues that are worthy of article-length treatment on their
own.32
This essay will instead confine itself to analysis of criminal cases and
their close brethren, national security cases. Even with this narrowed focus,
other ambiguities arise. Classic examples of criminal evidence include
fruits of a crime (such as money stolen from a bank), instrumentalities of
crime (such as a murder weapon), and contraband (such as illicit drugs).
But the courts have authorized searches for and seizures of many other
types of items in criminal cases. First, courts have issued warrants based on
probable cause to believe that police will be able to find what used to be
called “mere evidence,”33 such as negatives in the possession of a third
party that might help prove a crime occurred,34 an invoice from an attorney
who is alleged to be a co-conspirator,35 or company logs proving that a

28. Id. at 1328 tbl.4.
29. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 371 (2009) (emphasis
added).
30. See, e.g., Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 318-19 (1971) (permitting the
government to condition receipt of welfare benefits on warrantless searches of residences);
Camara v. Municipal Ct. of City & Cnty. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 538-39 (1967) (permitting
searches of residences to enforce health and safety codes after a warrant has been obtained).
31. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
32. I develop some preliminary ideas on this topic in Christopher Slobogin, Government
Dragnets, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2010, at 107; see also Eve Brensike Primus,
Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 254 (2011).
33. See Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 309-10 (1967).
34. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 567-68 (1978) (holding that a warrant
is sufficient to obtain negatives from a newspaper office).
35. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 310 (1921) (holding that seizure of an
attorney’s bill for legal services was impermissible), abrogated by Hayden, 387 U.S. 294.
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person has phoned the number of a victim.36 Further, the “mere” evidence
sought may be highly circumstantial, or very tangential to any element in
the case, such as items proving gang membership in a case of domestic
violence,37 or indicia of house ownership in a case involving possession or
sale of drugs found in a residence already known to be occupied by the
suspect.38 Finally, if the word “evidence” is read broadly to include
information that would not be considered relevant in court but might help
catch the perpetrator of criminal activity, then the object of the search could
also include information that can help locate the individual, such as her cell
phone signals or credit card purchases.39
With the exception of the locational examples, these various gradations
of “evidence” have not given pause to courts construing the Fourth
Amendment, at least since the Supreme Court’s 1967 decision in Warden,
Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, which eliminated the prohibition on
seizure of mere evidence.40 Over four decades earlier, in Gouled v. United
States, the Court had held that search warrants “may not be used as a means
of gaining access to a man’s house or office and papers solely for the
purpose of making search to secure evidence to be used against him in a
criminal or penal proceeding” unless the government has a superior
property interest in the evidence, as is the case with fruits and
instrumentalities of crime and contraband.41 In Hayden, however, the Court
reversed this aspect of Gouled, stating:
Privacy is disturbed no more by a search directed to a purely
evidentiary object than it is by a search directed to an
36. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979) (holding that police could seize a
phone record showing the defendant phoned the victim).
37. Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1248-49 (2012) (implying that a
warrant can authorize a search for evidence of gang membership on these facts). Millender
is discussed further in the text accompanying notes 81-93. See also United States v. Rubio,
727 F.2d 786, 792 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that “a narrowly drawn, and properly issued and
executed warrant which authorizes the search for indicia of membership or association” does
not violate the First Amendment).
38. United States v. McLaughlin, 851 F.2d 283, 286 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that “[a]
search warrant may be used, not only to gather evidence of a criminal activity, but also to
gather evidence of who controlled the premises suspected of connection with criminal acts”).
39. E.g., In re Application of United States for an Order Authorizing Disclosure of
Location Info. of a Specified Wireless Telephone, 849 F. Supp. 2d 526, 536 (D. Md. 2011)
(holding that a warrant may not authorize seizure of data about a suspect’s location unless he
is a fugitive because otherwise the data are not evidence).
40. 387 U.S. 294, 302 (1967).
41. 255 U.S. 298, 309 (1921).
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instrumentality, fruit, or contraband. A magistrate can intervene
in both situations, and the requirements of probable cause and
specificity can be preserved intact. Moreover, nothing in the
nature of property seized as evidence renders it more private
than property seized, for example, as an instrumentality; quite
the opposite may be true. Indeed, the distinction is wholly
irrational, since, depending on the circumstances, the same
‘papers and effects’ may be ‘mere evidence’ in one case and
‘instrumentality’ in another.42
Hayden reserved for another day the issue of whether mere evidence that
is “testimonial” in nature—such as documents—may be seized, suggesting
that the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against compelling testimony could
limit its holding in some situations.43 But later cases made clear that a
search for papers does not implicate the Fifth Amendment, because neither
the content of the papers nor their production is compelled by the State.44
Subsequent cases also held that even papers that could be said to be
protected by the First Amendment may be seized upon the usual, probable
cause showing required for searches of other types of items.45 In short, the
Constitution permits searches for and seizures of any “things”—to use the
Fourth Amendment’s language—regardless of their nature, so long as there
is adequate cause to believe they will be found and they have some nexus to
suspected wrongdoing.46

42. Hayden, 387 U.S. at 302.
43. Id. at 302-03 (“The items of clothing involved in this case are not ‘testimonial’ or
‘communicative’ in nature, and their introduction therefore did not compel respondent to
become a witness against himself in violation of the Fifth Amendment.”).
44. See, e.g., Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 473-74 (1976) (“[A]lthough the
Fifth Amendment may protect an individual from complying with a subpoena for the
production of his personal records in his possession because the very act of production may
constitute a compulsory authentication of incriminating information, a seizure of the same
materials by law enforcement officers differs in a crucial respect―the individual against
whom the search is directed is not required to aid in the discovery, production, or
authentication of incriminating evidence.” (internal citations omitted)).
45. New York v. P. J. Video, Inc., 475 U.S. 868, 875 (1986) (“[A]n application for a
warrant authorizing the seizure of materials presumptively protected by the First
Amendment should be evaluated under the same standard of probable cause used to review
warrant applications generally.”).
46. For an argument that the Court’s jurisprudence in this area is wrongheaded, see
Note, Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy Under the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments, 90 HARV. L. REV. 945, 987-88 (1977).
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Yet, as a general rule, the further one moves from the classic triad of
fruits of crime, instrumentalities of crime, and contraband, the greater the
government’s authority to invade privacy becomes. As Judge Learned
Hand stated,
If the search is permitted at all, perhaps it does not make so
much difference what is taken away, since the officers will
ordinarily not be interested in what does not incriminate, and
there can be no sound policy in protecting what does.
Nevertheless, limitations upon the fruit to be gathered tend to
limit the quest itself . . . .47
Consider, for instance, some of the examples of mere evidence given
earlier. Gang insignia could be anywhere in the home. Searches for indicia
of ownership can range far beyond a search for weapons or contraband, to
include, in the words of the boilerplate warrant language often used in one
jurisdiction, “all papers, documents, and effects which tend to show
possession, dominion and control over said premises, including
fingerprints, handwritings, clothing and objects bearing a form of
identification such as a person’s name, photograph, Social Security number
or driver’s license number.”48 Most relevant to this essay, information
about location, associations, and activities around the time of a crime might
be found in a wide range of records, buried in the middle of reams of
information that have nothing to do with the suspected criminal activity.49
Furthermore, in the absence of a mere evidence limitation, searches are
permissible even if the sole goal is obtaining such attenuated evidence. As
47. United States v. Poller, 43 F.2d 911, 914 (2d Cir. 1930); see also United States v. A
Parcel of Land, Bldgs., Appurtenances, & Improvements, Known as 92 Buena Vista Ave.,
Rumson, N.J., 507 U.S. 111, 121 (1993) (citing Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547,
577-80 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting)) (“The holding in [Hayden’s holding] that the Fourth
Amendment did not prohibit the seizure of ‘mere evidence’ marked an important expansion
of governmental power.”).
48. Laurence A. Benner & Charles T. Samarkos, Searching for Narcotics in San Diego:
Preliminary Findings from the San Diego Search Warrant Project, 36 CAL. W. L. REV. 221,
254 (2000).
49. Note that the same issue arises when the police are validly intruding into a particular
area or document looking for evidence of one crime and come across an item in plain view
that might be evidence of another wrongdoing. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 738
(1983) (“The seizure of property in plain view involves no invasion of privacy and is
presumptively reasonable, assuming that there is probable cause to associate the property
with criminal activity.”). Again, however, nothing in the plain view doctrine limits what the
evidence can be. See id. at 737 (stating that the seized item need only be “evidence of a
crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure”)).
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one commentator noted shortly after Hayden was decided, without some
limit on the object of a search an imaginative officer could emasculate the
probable cause requirement even in connection with private documents:
According to the language of the [Hayden] majority, if the object
seized will aid in the apprehension, conviction, or identification
of the accused it may be seized. . . . Certainly all private letters
and papers would aid in identifying the handwriting of the
accused. The diary of an accused might be helpful in destroying
his alibi. The private files of a suspect might be useful in his
apprehension. Surely an ‘unpatriotic’ political sentiment
expressed in private writings would aid in the conviction of one
accused of sabotage or espionage.50
The distinction between the standard of proof and the object of the
search also arises in connection with the law of subpoenas. In United States
v. R. Enterprises, Inc.,51 the Supreme Court pointed out that the typical
discovery subpoena, issued after a complaint or charge is filed, will only
issue if it is based on “a reasonably specific request for information that
would be both relevant and admissible at trial.”52 In contrast, a grand jury
subpoena, issued during the investigative phase before a charge has been
filed, should only be denied when “there is no reasonable possibility that
the category of materials the Government seeks will produce information
relevant to the general subject of the grand jury’s investigation.”53 In both
cases, “relevance” is the standard of proof. But the object of the subpoena
in the two situations is quite different. In the discovery context, the object
is an item or items considered relevant to a particular charge, whereas in the
investigative context it is anything relevant to the “general subject” of an
investigation, which does not have to be aimed at any particular charge or
person. As the Court acknowledged, the latter standard is much easier to
meet than the former.54
In short, defining concepts like probable cause, reasonable suspicion, and
like standards of proof is only half the job of delineating justificatory
50. Fournier J. Gale, Comment, Constitutional Law-Evidence-Clothing of Suspect Held
Admissible Even Though It Was “Mere Evidence” of Crime, 20 ALA. L. REV. 149, 157
(1967).
51. 498 U.S. 292 (1991).
52. Id. at 299 (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 700 (1974)).
53. Id. at 301.
54. Id. at 298-99 (explaining why grand jury subpoenas need not meet the requirements
imposed on discovery).
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standards. Some attention should also be paid to the extent to which the
items that law enforcement believes the search will uncover can further an
investigation. The object of the search might be “mere evidence” or not
evidence at all; it might be aimed at helping prove a specific crime or it
might be information about a crime as-yet unknown or even not yet
committed. Defining the object of a search can be as important as defining
the level of certainty that the object will be found.
II. The LEATPR Standards and the NSA’s Metadata Program
The American Bar Association’s Criminal Justice Standards on Law
Enforcement Access to Third Party Records, adopted by the ABA House of
Delegates in February 2012,55 vary both the standard of proof and the object
of the search in their provisions defining the justification necessary to
obtain information from third party records. The Standards recognize three
species of courts orders: the first based on “probable cause to believe the
information in the record contains or will lead to evidence of crime,” the
second on “reasonable suspicion to believe the information in the record
contains or will lead to evidence of crime,” and the third on a finding that
the “record is relevant to an investigation.”56 The Standards also provide
for a “prosecutorial certification” to a judge that must meet the relevanceto-an-investigation test, and for a subpoena from a prosecutor or agency
that may be issued on the same ground.57 Finally, the Standards describe a
standard, called an “official certification,” that requires a “reasonable
possibility that the record is relevant to initiating or pursuing an
investigation.”58 That these phrases are meant to reflect decreasingly
demanding levels of justification is made clear by subsequent provisions
that require a probable cause court order for “highly protected” information
and a reasonable suspicion court order (or, in the alternative, a relevance
determination by a judge or prosecutor) for “moderately protected
information.”59 Further, only a subpoena meeting the relevance standard is
needed for “minimally protected information,”60 and an official certification
meeting the “reasonable possibility” standard suffices for accessing “de-

55. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS
RECORDS iii (2013).
56. STANDARD 25-5.2(a)(i)-(iii).
57. STANDARD 25-5.2(a)(iv), (b).
58. STANDARD 25-5.2(c).
59. STANDARD 25-5.3(a)(i)-(iii).
60. STANDARD 25-5.3(a)(iii).
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identified” records (i.e., records that are not easily linked to an identified
person).61
In general, the idea that the level of justification should become less
onerous as the privacy content of the sought-after records decreases makes
sense. I have defended and elaborated on this proportionality idea
elsewhere and am gratified that the ABA has endorsed it.62 Although
parsing the differences between probable cause and the Standards’ other
standards of proof can be difficult, most would probably agree that
relevance is an easier standard to meet than either probable cause or
reasonable suspicion.63 One could also conclude that relevance as
determined by a judge is different, and more restrictive, than relevance
certified by a prosecutor and rubberstamped by a judge, which in turn is
more restrictive than relevance determined by a prosecutor or an
administrative bureaucrat who does not have to go to a judge at all.64 So at
least the Standards could be said to create a hierarchy that makes
conceptual sense.
More important to the focus of this essay is the fact that only the
probable cause and reasonable suspicion standards are linked with the
phrase “evidence of crime.” The other standards merely require a
connection “to an investigation.” Thus, the various relevance provisions in
the LEATPR Standards are more relaxed than traditional Fourth
Amendment justifications in two ways—not just in terms of the standard of
proof but in terms of the object of the surveillance.
Consider in light of this discussion the NSA’s bulk collection of
metadata—again, the recently controversial program that is aimed at
accumulating, anonymously as an initial matter, the phone and text
transmittal information of everyone in the country. This information is
clearly not contraband or fruits of crime, and only a very stretched
definition of the word “instrumentality” would place a phone number or
email address in this third category, even if it were a number used by a
criminal to carry out a crime. The metadata might be considered “mere
61. STANDARD 25-5.6(a).
62. See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT
SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 21-47 (2007).
63. Cf. id. at 38-39 (proposing “four tiers” of justification: relevance, reasonable
suspicion, probable cause, and clear and convincing evidence).
64. Cf. RICHARD VAN DUIZEND, L. PAUL SUTTON & CHARLOTTE A. CARTER, THE
SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS: PRECONCEPTIONS, PERCEPTIONS, AND PRACTICES 148-49 (1985)
(finding that requiring police to make a showing of probable cause to a judge increased the
standard of care).
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evidence” if, for instance, it could help the government discover that certain
people are communicating with a known terrorist. But at the time of the
bulk collection, those links would not be known; the NSA would
subsequently have to query the data to learn about those links. Thus, one
would be hard pressed to say that, at the time of the bulk collection, the
government meets the relevance standard, much less the probable cause or
reasonable suspicion standards, if the object of the seizure is Redding’s
“evidence of criminal activity” or the LEATPR Standards’ “evidence of
crime” that is associated with the probable cause and reasonable suspicion
standards.
On the other hand, the bulk data might be relevant “to an investigation,”
and there is certainly a reasonable possibility that the data will be relevant
“to initiating or pursuing an investigation” (the two phrases describing the
object of the search in the Standards’ other justification provisions).65 That
is in fact what the government successfully argued in front of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) under section 215 of the Patriot Act,
which permits authorization of “any tangible things (including books,
records, papers, documents, and other items)” that are “relevant to an
authorized investigation . . . [designed] to protect against international
terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.”66 According to a 2009
opinion from the FISC, “The government depends on this bulk collection
because if production of the information were to wait until the specific
identifier connected to an international terrorist group were determined,
most of the historical connections (the entire purpose of this authorization)
would be lost.”67 The court continued,
Because the subset of terrorist communications is ultimately
contained within the whole of the metadata produced, but can
only be found after the production is aggregated and then
queried using identifiers determined to be associated with
identified international terrorist organizations, the whole
production is relevant to the ongoing investigation out of
necessity.68

65. STANDARD 25-5.2(a)(iii), (c).
66. The USA PATRIOT Act § 215, 50 U.S.C §§ 1861 (a)(1), (b)(2)(A) (2012).
67. In re Application of the F.B.I. for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things
From . . . , BR 13-109, 22, (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct. July 29, 2013), available at
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/791759-br13-09-primary-order.html.
68. Id. (emphasis added).
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The LEATPR Standards appear to endorse precisely the same argument.
Standard 25-5.6 permits access to “de-identified records” if there is a
“reasonable possibility that [a] record [will be] relevant [to] . . . an
investigation.”69 De-identified records are defined as records that are not
“linked” or are not “linkable through reasonable efforts” to an identifiable
person, which arguably describes the status of the anonymous numbers
acquired during the bulk collection.70
Now consider how the Standards would deal with the NSA’s process of
querying the records obtained through the bulk collection process (with
apologies in advance for the complicated textual analysis). For this process
of linking the records to a particular person, the Standards require greater
justification, which varies depending on the nature of the record. Under
Standard 25-5.3(a), if phone metadata is considered “moderately
protected,” for instance, it can be linked to a particular person only if, under
the ABA’s preferred standard for those types of records, a court finds
“reasonable suspicion . . . the information in the record contains or will lead
to evidence of crime.”71 The Standards’ two-step process—incorporating
the distinction between the standard for acquiring anonymous records,
which is relatively easily met, and the standard for investigating identified
records, which imposes a stronger justification—is known as “selective
revelation,” and has been endorsed by a number of commentators.72
At least at its initial stage, the NSA’s procedure for querying the deidentified metadata it has collected in bulk appears to meet or exceed the
selective revelation requirements imposed by the Standards. According to
the NSA, analysis of the metadata it has collected begins with what the
NSA calls a “seed identifier,” such as a phone number that the agency
(double-checked by the FISC) has “reasonable, articulable suspicion” to
believe is associated with a terrorist organization.73 That standard is similar
69. STANDARD 25-5.2(c), 25-5.6(a) (requiring an “official certification” to obtain deidentified records).
70. STANDARD 25-1.1(g). But see Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding
to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701 (2010) (explaining that
de-anonymization is very easily carried out).
71. STANDARD 25-5.2(a)(ii), 25-5.3(a)(ii).
72. See generally K. A. Taipale, Data Mining and Domestic Security: Connecting the
Dots to Make Sense of Data, 5 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 79-80 (2003) (describing
selective revelation).
73. NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY: MISSIONS, AUTHORITIES,
OVERSIGHT AND PARTNERSHIPS 5 (2013), available at http://www.nsa.gov/publicinfo/files/
speeches_testimonies/2013_08_09_the_nsa_story.pdf.
Until January, 2014, this
determination was made by NSA analysts; the FISC was only involved in approving the list
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to the Standards’ preferred standard of proof for obtaining moderately
protected records (assuming the word “crime” is read to include terrorist
acts and analogous acts).74
But the NSA does not stop there. While the agency has not explicitly
stated how many links beyond the seed identifier it investigates, testimony
by an NSA official in the summer of 2013 indicated that the FISC has
allowed NSA staffers to “go out two or three hops” from the target.75 In
other words, the NSA attempts to identify everyone who communicates
with the seed identifier, as well as those who communicate with the first
and second links to that identifier. Given the suspected terrorist affiliation
of the seed identifier, the Standards’ reasonable suspicion standard might be
met with respect to the first link. But it would be hard to conclude that, in
the absence of any other information, the government has reasonable
suspicion that the identity of a person three links out from the seed
identifier is “evidence of crime” or could “lead to” such evidence. This
type of concern is presumably what motivated President Barack Obama, in
January 2014, to declare that henceforth the NSA would only be permitted
to query two hops from the seed identifier.76

of terrorist organizations, not in confirming that reasonable suspicion existed in connection
with a seed identifier. Id. On January 17, 2014, President Obama apparently ordered that, in
non-emergency situations, the FISC must sign off on the NSA’s reasonable suspicion
determination. Obama’s Speech on N.S.A.’s Phone Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2014,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/18/us/politics/obamas-speech-on-nsa-phonesurveillance.html?_r=0 (“I have directed the Attorney General to work with the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court so that during this transition period, the database can be
queried only after a judicial finding or in the case of a true emergency.”). Legislation
proposed by the Obama Administration in March, 2014, would codify this rule. See Charlie
Savage, Obama to Call for End to N.S.A’s Bulk Data Collection, N. Y. TIMES, March 24,
2014.
74. Note also that, under the Standards, if a justification requirement “would render law
enforcement unable to solve or prevent an unacceptable amount of otherwise solvable or
preventable crime . . . a legislature may consider reducing . . . the level of protection for that
type of information.” STANDARD 25-4.2(b). Given the already minimal justification
requirements for most records, this concession to law enforcement seems unnecessary and,
in any event, illegitimately states that if a justification standard gets in the way of law
enforcement, law enforcement agencies can disregard it.
75. Kris, supra note 3, at 12 n.49 (quoting The Administration’s Use of FISA
Authorities: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement
of John C. Inglis, Deputy Director, NSA)).
76. Obama’s Speech, supra note 73 (“Effective immediately, we will only pursue phone
calls that are two steps removed from a number associated with a terrorist organization
instead of the current three.”).
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Recall, however, that the Standards recognize an alternative justification
for cases involving moderately protected records. If that alternative
standard is applied, the government would only need to obtain “a judicial
determination that the record is relevant to an investigation” or to produce a
“prosecutorial certification that the record is relevant to an investigation.”77
Not only is relevance a lower standard of proof than reasonable suspicion,
the object of the search—an “investigation”—is much more capacious.
Analogous to the distinction made by the Court in R. Enterprises, whereas
the phrase “leading to evidence of crime” suggests that some specific
wrongdoing (in this context, association with a terrorist) is the object of the
search,78 the word “investigation” implies an exploration of anyone who
might be connected to a seed identifier, which imposes virtually no limits
on the government’s query.79 Perhaps the Standards’ recognition of an
even lower standard—the aforementioned provision regarding de-identified
records that requires only a “reasonable possibility that the record is
relevant to initiating or pursuing an investigation”—can be said to cabin
the phrase “relevant to . . . an investigation”80 in the Standards’ other
provisions. But the fact remains that much may ride on which of the
alternative standards in Standard 25-5.3(a)(ii) the jurisdiction adopts. The
combination of the lower standard of proof (“relevance” compared to
“reasonable suspicion”) and the more indistinct object of the surveillance
(“an investigation” compared to “evidence of crime”) markedly reduces the
government’s burden.
Indeed, one could easily make the argument that even the identity of a
person ten “hops” from the seed identifier is “relevant to an investigation,”
if the word “investigation” encompasses not just attempts to get information
about the seed identifier and his known associates but also about
“terrorists” or “threats to national security.” In contrast, the government’s
argument would be much harder if it had to show that the identity of a
given link is relevant in the sense that it could “lead to evidence” of a
specific threat to national security; that language implies that the name
identified via the query must either be evidence or connect directly to such
evidence. Application of the Standards to the NSA’s metadata program
illustrates that defining the object of the search is at least as important as
defining the level of certainty the decision maker must have that the object
will be discovered.
77.
78.
79.
80.

STANDARD 25-5.2(a)(iii)-(iv), 25.3(a)(ii).
See supra text accompanying notes 51-54.
The commentary to the Standards does not discuss this issue.
STANDARD 25-5.2(c) (emphasis added).
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III. Defining the Object of the Search

So how should the object of a search be defined? The seeds of an answer
are found in the recent Supreme Court decision in Messerschmidt v.
Millender,81 the case involving evidence of gang membership that was
briefly alluded to above. In Millender, the police obtained a search warrant
to search the home of the Millenders, believing that one Jerry Bowen lived
there and that they might find evidence that would help prove he had
assaulted his ex-girlfriend.82 Because the ex-girlfriend said Bowen was a
gang member, among the items listed in the warrant were “[a]rticles of
evidence showing . . . affiliation with any [s]treet [g]ang.”83
Millender challenged the validity of this aspect of the warrant with the
argument that, because membership in a gang is not a crime, a magistrate
should not be authorized to issue a warrant aimed merely at obtaining
evidence of gang membership.84 Because the officer who drafted the
warrant application admitted that the crime being investigated was not
gang-related but rather was a domestic dispute,85 and because the facts
supported that assumption,86 Millender contended that the gang information
was irrelevant to criminal prosecution.
But the majority in Millender strongly signaled that it felt otherwise.87
First, it stated that evidence of gang membership could have shown that the
assault was not motivated, as the ex-girlfriend had suggested, by “the
souring of [a] romantic relationship,” but rather by a fear that the victim

81. 132 S. Ct. 1235 (2012).
82. Id. at 1242.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1247 (noting that Millender contended that “‘the magistrate [could not] have
reasonably concluded, based on the affidavit, that Bowen’s gang membership had anything
to do with the crime under investigation’ because ‘[t]he affidavit described a ‘spousal
assault’ that ensued after Kelly decided to end her ‘on going dating relationship’ with
Bowen’ and ‘[n]othing in that description suggests that the crime was gang-related’”); see
also id. at 1257 n.7 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting that membership in a gang is not a
crime in the state of California).
85. Id. at 1248 n.6.
86. Cf. id. at 1255 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Every piece of information . . . accorded
with Detective Messerschmidt's conclusion: The crime was domestic violence that was not
gang related.”).
87. Since the issue in Millender was whether the officer had qualified immunity, the
Court’s discussion focused on whether a “reasonable officer” could have believed the gang
insignia would be evidence of crime, not whether the Fourth Amendment authorizes search
of such items on the facts of Millender. Id. at 1244.
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would disclose Bowen’s gang activity to the police.88 Second, based on the
same reasoning, the evidence might have supported obstruction of justice
charges.89 The majority also speculated that the evidence could have been
used to impeach Bowen if he had taken the stand and testified that he didn’t
use a gun during the assault; the evidence of gang membership could have
shown he was familiar with guns and the kind of gun the victim said he
used.90 As the dissenting opinions on this issue pointed out, the majority
had to be very imaginative in coming up with these possible uses of items
showing Bowen was associated with a gang.91 Even so, the majority was
right to surmise that the gang insignia, had it been found (in fact, it was
not92), could have helped prove motive or could have helped impeach.
Note that the issue in Millender was not whether the standard of proof
was met. Given the victim’s statements, the police clearly had probable
cause to believe they would find gang-related items in the Millender’s
house. Rather, the issue in Millender was the relevance of the object of the
search—whether the items identified in the warrant could be useful in a
subsequent criminal prosecution.
While the majority in Millender had no difficulty answering this question
in the affirmative, the precedent it relied on—in particular, Warden,
Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden—appears to require a different answer,
an answer that is very helpful in thinking about the object of the search
issue. In bolstering its conclusion that the gang information in Millender
could be seized, the Court stated that “[t]he Fourth Amendment does not
require probable cause to believe evidence will conclusively establish a fact
before permitting a search, but only ‘probable cause . . . to believe the
evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction.’”93 The
Court seemed to think Hayden’s language, particularly the use of the word
“aid,” supported its case. But look closely at the quoted language. Hayden
says that the object of the search must be evidence that “will aid”
88. Id. at 1247.
89. Id. at 1248.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1251 (Kagan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (referring to “the
Court’s elaborate theory-spinning”); id. at 1254 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The Court
reaches this result only by way of an unprecedented, post hoc reconstruction of the crime
that wholly ignores the police’s own conclusions, as well as the undisputed facts presented
to the District Court.”).
92. Id. at 1243 (noting that the search resulted only in the seizure of a weapon and
ammunition).
93. Id. at 1257 n.7 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294, 307 (1967)).
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apprehension or conviction, not “might aid.” If probable cause (the
standard of proof at issue in Millender) is quantified at 40-50%, then
Hayden’s language as applied to Millender requires a 40-50% likelihood
that the gang information will aid in apprehension or conviction. Despite
the majority’s innovative hypotheses about how the evidence could have
been used, that showing is not possible on the facts of Millender. Only if
the victim had said, or the police had other plausible reasons to believe, that
Bowen was trying to hurt her to shut her up about his gang activities would
such grounds exist.
Now consider a case involving access to third party records. Assume
police have a tip from a reliable informant that John Doe is a
methamphetamine dealer. Can they now access Doe’s bank records for the
past year to see if he has made large deposits from time to time, or his
phone records over the next several months to see if he is calling known
drug consumers, or his credit card records for the past two weeks to see if
he is buying certain types of materials? Whether it is interpreting the
Fourth Amendment or statutory language, the Supreme Court’s Millender
majority might say yes, because any of this information—all of which can
be particularly described sufficiently for Fourth Amendment purposes—
might aid in Doe’s prosecution. But if the standard of proof were probable
cause or reasonable suspicion, and Hayden’s definition of the object of the
search is adopted, a good argument can be made that access to these records
should not be allowed, at least if the informant has only told us that Doe is
selling drugs. In that case, there is only a small chance that any given set of
records will aid in Doe’s conviction. Even if large deposits, calls to
particular people, or purchases of certain items were discovered, that
information is at least as consistent with legal activity as illegal activity.
Only if the informant provides a particular date Doe sold drugs or provided
other more particularized information about what might be in the records
would there be a plausible argument that any given bank, phone, and credit
card records will aid the prosecution’s case.
Notably, in their definition of probable cause and reasonable suspicion,
the ABA Standards adhere to Hayden’s language. Both definitions speak in
terms of whether a records search will obtain evidence of crime or lead to
such evidence.94 That formulation endorses a relatively tight approach to
the object of the search. In contrast, as noted above, the Standards’
definition of relevance adopts a much more capacious approach to the

94. Compare STANDARD 25-5.2(a)(i)-(ii), with Hayden, 387 U.S. at 307.
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object of the search by referring merely to “an investigation” of criminal
activity.95
I have proposed a regime for accessing third party records that differs
from the ABA Standards (and the Court’s apparent position after Millender)
in several ways, two of which are directly relevant to this discussion.96
First, because it potentially imposes no meaningful limitation on law
enforcement, I avoid the relevance standard of proof and propose that the
government should have to demonstrate either probable cause or reasonable
suspicion when it is seeking access to records held by an institutional third
party in connection with an investigation of an individual.97 More
important, for present purposes, is the way in which my proposal defines
the object of the search in connection with these two standards of proof.
The proposed definition of probable cause is as follows: “[a]n articulable
belief that a search will more likely than not produce contraband, fruit of
crime, or other significant evidence of wrongdoing.”98 And the proposed
definition of reasonable suspicion is: “An articulable belief that a search
will more likely than not lead to evidence of wrongdoing.”99
Note that both definitions adopt a “more likely than not,” or
preponderance of the evidence, standard of proof. There is no attempt to
differentiate between the two standards based on the level of certainty (for
instance, by conceptualizing probable cause as “more likely than not” and
reasonable suspicion as something below that). Rather, the difference
between the standards lies entirely in the object of the search. The probable
95. See STANDARD 25-5.2(a)(iii)-(iv).
96. Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most of United States v. Jones in a Surveillance
Society: A Statutory Implementation of Mosaic Theory, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1
(2012). Another difference between the proposal and the Standards that is indirectly
relevant to this discussion is the way the proposal defines the hierarchy of records.
Specifically, I proposed that probable cause be required if the records described activities
over more than a forty-eight-hour period, and that the reasonable suspicion standard should
apply in all other situations in which protected records are accessed. Id. at 28. I argued that
this temporally defined method of differentiating the justification required for a records
search, while somewhat arbitrary, is more easily applied than the ABA’s multifactor test in
Standard § 25-4.1, id. at 28-29, and is also more consistent with the concurring opinions in
United States v. Jones. See 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[T]he use of longer
term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of
privacy.” (emphasis added)); see also id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (agreeing with
Justice Alito’s statement).
97. Slobogin, supra note 96, at 28 (requiring either probable cause or reasonable
suspicion for “targeted data searches”).
98. Id. at 20.
99. Id. at 22.
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cause standard requires that the object be contraband, fruits of crime, or
other significant evidence of wrongdoing. The last phrase is obviously
somewhat vague, but is meant to be informed by its association with
contraband and fruits of crime. In other words, searches for mere evidence,
highly circumstantial or tangible evidence, or information that is not
evidence at all (such as the location of a suspect), are not authorized in
those situations that require probable cause. In contrast, reasonable
suspicion merely requires a belief that, more likely than not, the search will
“lead” to evidence of wrongdoing, and thus could contemplate accessing
records that are not significant evidence of crime.100 If these definitions of
probable cause and reasonable suspicion replaced the Standards’
justificatory standards (but the Standards’ regulatory structure were
otherwise retained), they would require the government to show that
accessing “highly protected records” would more likely than not produce
significant evidence of crime, and that accessing other types of records (at
least other than those that are denominated “unprotected”) would require a
showing that the information they contained would more likely than not
lead to any evidence of wrongdoing.
With these proposed adjustments to the Standards in mind, return to the
NSA’s metadata program. Assuming the NSA queries were aimed at
moderately protected records, they could only proceed under the adjusted
Standards if they would likely lead to evidence of wrongdoing. This
threshold would become progressively harder to meet with each link
beyond the original target. It would probably permit identification of the
first link from the seed identifier,101 but might well prohibit any further
linking, barring additional articulable information about the seed identifier
or the first link that made pursuit of numbers further down the chain
reasonable. In short, the definition of the search’s object could place a
significant limitation on the NSA’s metadata program.102
100. Thus, for instance, the reasonable suspicion standard would not bar obtaining
location information about a suspect, since that information could lead to evidence of crime.
See id.
101. As the Supreme Court stated in CIA v. Sims, “[B]its and pieces of data ‘may aid in
piecing together bits of other information even when the individual piece is not of obvious
importance in itself.’” 471 U.S. 159, 178 (1985) (quoting Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144,
150 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
102. The probable cause and reasonable suspicion standards I propose only apply to
“targeted” searches, and thus would not govern the NSA’s initial, bulk collection process,
which is aimed at the population at large. A separate aspect of the proposed regulatory
scheme would permit these types of “general searches” only if “authorized by legislation or
regulations issued pursuant to such legislation” and only if they applied evenly to those

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2014

746

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:725

Conclusion
In fashioning rules governing access to records or any other type of
search activity, courts and legislatures should be alert not only to standards
of proof, such as probable cause or reasonable suspicion, but also to the
object of the search. While the Fourth Amendment apparently puts no
restrictions on the types of information that the government may gather so
long as it has a nexus to wrongdoing, however attenuated, a failure to place
further restrictions on the object of a search can vastly increase the
government’s authority to intrude into privacy. The ABA Standards on
Law Enforcement Access to Third Party Records recognize this point and
to a small extent differentiate government authority to act based on it. But
as illustrated by this essay’s analysis of how the Standards would apply to
the NSA’s metadata surveillance program, the ABA’s provisions could
authorize virtually unlimited access to all but the most highly protected
records. A regime that limited the object of the search to significant
evidence of wrongdoing when probable cause is required and to
information that will lead to such evidence when reasonable suspicion is
required would provide a more meaningful and coherent restriction on
government access to third party records.

affected. See Slobogin, supra note 96, at 30-32 (describing regulation of “general public and
data searches”). This formulation is an implementation of political process theory, and
would probably permit bulk data collection, given the passage and repeated reaffirmation of
section 215 (despite Snowden’s revelations) and given its application to the entire country
rather than a discrete group. See Christopher Slobogin, Panvasive Surveillance, Political
Process Theory and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 102 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2014). If,
however, the legislation authorizing the bulk collection focused on a discrete and insular
minority (or if there were no authorizing legislation at all), then a second aspect of the
proposed definitions of probable cause and reasonable suspicion—indicating that those
determinations “may be based on statistical analysis”—would come into play. Slobogin,
supra note 96, at 20, 22. As applied to mass collection of records, this language would
require a showing that roughly one-half of the records would produce evidence of crime
(where probable cause is required) or lead to evidence of crime (where reasonable suspicion
is required). See id. at 32. Neither showing is likely in the NSA context.
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